Battle of the Bulge, part 2: Surprise attack

Published 5:33 am Tuesday, December 17, 2019

Read part 1 here: Autumn Fog


In the early hours of Dec. 16, 1944, cloudy weather lay over the Ardennes Forest, an area of dense growth along France’s northeast border with Belgium and Luxembourg. Because of the forest’s denseness, Allied units in the area were spread thin, with only four American divisions defending the Ardennes.

Among them was the U.S. 106th Infantry Division, a group of green soldiers who had only arrived in France 10 days earlier. On Dec. 11, the 106th found itself on the frontline, relieving the battle-hardened U.S. Second Infantry Division and occupying a 26-mile long area stretching along the Ardennes in Belgium.

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“Don’t worry,” veteran soldiers of the Second Infantry Division told them. “There is nothing out there.”

Assured by these veteran soldiers, the men of the 106th believed they were in for a boring stay on the frontline. Occasionally in the distance, the sound of vehicles moving prompted men on the line to report what they were hearing, but these reports were largely dismissed. The Germans, they were told, knew they were green and were playing recordings to try and scare them.

But any illusions the men had of a quiet, uneventful stay on the front were shattered in the predawn hours of Dec. 16.

The German attack began with an artillery barrage on the American positions, which was promptly followed by a rapid infantry assault. The green Americans found themselves facing waves of German troops as Hitler put his plan into motion. The 422nd and 423rd Regiments of the 106th were quickly cut off from the rest of the division; they surrendered three days later, resulting in the capture of between 6-7,000 prisoners, one of the largest mass surrenders in U.S. military history. Among them was writer Kurt Vonnegut, whose experiences inspired his 1969 novel “Slaughterhouse-Five.” Maj. Gen. Alan Jones, commander of the 106th, said, “I’ve lost a division quicker than any division commander in the U.S. Army.”

News of the attack reached Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Dwight Eisenhower while he was attending the wedding of a subordinate; British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery was alerted during a game of golf. In the meantime, the Germans overwhelmed American forces along a 70-mile front, capturing many unprepared prisoners. Some of them were non-combat rear echelon units, like cooks and division bands, who found themselves fighting in a hastily prepared defense using rifles they had not held since basic training and weapons they had no experience handling. Elements of the First SS Panzer Division resorted to murdering prisoners; the largest mass execution occurred on Dec. 17, when members of Kampfgruppe Peiper machine-gunned 86 prisoners in the Belgian town of Malmedy in what later became known as the “Malmedy Massacre.”

To further add to the confusion, English-speaking Germans wearing captured American uniforms infiltrated the Allied lines. They acted as saboteurs, cutting telephone lines, changing road signs and killing military police directing troop convoys. To combat this, American guards were tasked with challenging anyone approaching checkpoints with questions that were familiar to Americans, such as who was Mickey Mouse’s girlfriend. But that approach wasn’t foolproof as sometimes Americans did not know the answers. For example, a guard let Gen. Omar Bradley pass through a checkpoint despite not knowing the name of actress Betty Grable’s husband, but Bradley was detained after telling a guard the capital of Illinois was Springfield (the guard thought it was Chicago).

Because Hitler had ordered complete radio silence on the matter, the Allies were unable to intercept any messages in the weeks leading up to the attack. They had previously detected a transfer of panzer divisions from the Eastern Front, as well as messages from German Field Marshal Otto Moritz Walter Model calling for detailed aerial reconnaissance over the Ardennes. These warnings were generally dismissed.

The Allied leadership’s failure to recognize the threat and give credence to initial reports of German activity near the Ardennes is considered one of the greatest intelligence blunders of World War II. They had underestimated the Germans’ capability to launch an effective offensive, believing they were low on manpower and equipment. A member of Bradley’s staff said he overhead him ask, “Where the hell did the son of a (expletive) get all of this stuff?”

As German tanks rolled toward the Meuse River, the question remained: How would Allied leadership respond?